The authors argue that the specificity of the Russian case of secularity is generally underestimated. This leads to two negative consequences. First, it leads researchers to consider the regimes of secularity in Eastern Europe as variations of the “Soviet model,” which is false. Second, it entails inaccuracies in the analysis of the regime of secularity that has developed in post-Soviet Russia, which the authors propose to describe as “post-atheistic.” The special Russian case involved the destruction of the very mechanism of religious and cultural transmission during the period of Communist rule. This destruction resulted in other features of a post-atheistic society: the relatively low relevance of religious symbols and narratives to the social fabric; the involvement of religious agency in projects of nation-building and, therefore, the predominantly ideological, rather than religious, motivation of the subjects of such agency; the top-down, rather than bottom-up, dynamic of the post-Soviet return of religion to the public sphere; the lack of broad public support for state activities in this field; and the widespread polarization of views on the role of public religion in modern society — either linking religion to cultural backwardness, or the total rejection of modernity and secular culture.